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Introduction
The twentieth century history of judicial review in national security cases in the United Kingdom (UK) provides an interesting counter-perspective to the orthodox, expansionary, accounts of review of administrative discretion in that jurisdiction during the same period. 4 judicial review of decisions taken on national security grounds was, for much of the twentieth century, held in an uneasy stasis. Simultaneously haunted by precedents such as Liversidge v. Anderson 5 and hamstrung by a perceived lack of competence to challenge judgments of the elected branches supported by assertions of imminent threat, the courts found themselves powerless to effectively displace the suggestion that national security questions were tantamount to being non-justiciable. 6 Progress towards bringing national security decisions within the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts demonstrated the common law at its incremental worst, lagging significantly behind judicial review in other spheres of executive discretion. Successes were often Pyrrhic; even in the notable GCHQ case -in which executive orders taken pursuant to the prerogative were found to be susceptible to review on procedural fairness grounds -Lord Diplock was able to follow his seminal restatement of the grounds of judicial review with the assertion that national security nevertheless remained … a matter upon which those upon whom the responsibility rests, and not the courts of justice, must have the last word. It is par excellence a non-justiciable question. The judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of problems, which it involves.
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The 'striking consistency' 8 of the courts' position during this period leads to the almost irresistible conclusion that national security decisions -regardless of their consequences for the rights or interests of individuals -fell unquestionably within the four corners of discretionary jurisdiction available to the executive, and therefore beyond the supervisory jurisdiction of the law courts.
In the light of broader developments in the law of judicial review, the 'mystical significance' 9 attached to the executive assertion of national security demonstrates a number of significant departures from the orthodox account of the development of the judicial function within the constitution. First, judicial review cases in which national security issues were present embraced a peculiar counter-polycentricity mindset. While judicial avoidance of intensive review of social or economic issues frequently emphasised the inability of the court to second-guess complex policy choices, national security questions were presented differently, leaving a sense that it was the simplicity (the apparent self-evidence that national security decisions are for the executive alone), rather than the complexity of the discretionary judgements made, that prompted the judicial denial of competence to intervene. Facts which melded intricate questions of public power, sensitive evidence and individual liberties were routinely distilled into a zero-sum claim. Second, in a constitution which has enjoyed an ambivalent relationship with separation of powers -in which the division of governmental functions is as often inferred as it is made explicit 10 -the solidity with which the courts insulated (apparently unfettered) executive competence over questions of security was remarkable. Finally, and most pertinently, for the reason that national security litigation resisted (or, at the very least, did not fully embrace) the expansionary tendencies of mainstream judicial review during the latter part of the twentieth century, one of the standard threads running through the juridification narrative -the judicially-driven nature of constitutional development -is conspicuously absent from the national security arena. The cumulative effect of these factors is that review of national security issues was seen to either be on the fringes of justiciability or on the very lowest rungs of the Wednesbury scale. Either way, the twentieth century history of counter-terrorist judicial review in the UK demonstrated a constitution in which courts were both powerless to counter the effects of rightsinfringing decisions and unduly reliant on the fortuitous compliance of the elected branches to achieve any meaningful change.
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Juridification on the Human Rights Act Model
Prior to the introduction of the Human Rights Act (HRA), the inability of judicial review to operate as an effective tool of scrutiny in the national security arena amounted to a significant weakness in the ability of the courts to subject government 3 to the rule of law. This problem was compounded by the parallel inadequacy of the legislature to effectively supervise the prerogative powers -the 'dead ground' of the constitution 12 -frequently deployed in pursuance of national security objectives. It took implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 to provide the legislative impetus to weaken, and finally break down, this rigid separation of functions and to expose national security decisions which interfered with individual rights to meaningful judicial scrutiny. The extent of this change should not be understated; in the light of the implementation of the Human Rights Act, national security justifications could (or should) no longer operate as virtually unquestionable defences to executive, or legislative, action interfering with one or more of the Convention rights. 13 The reach of the Human Rights Act's provisions is potentially huge; section 3(1) directs that all statutory provisions be interpreted -as far as is possible to do so -in order to achieve compatibility with the Convention rights; section 6(1) requires that all executive decisions (other than those compelled by primary legislation or by legislation which might not be interpreted in a Convention right-compatible manner 14 ) be compliant with the Convention rights. Operating in tandem, these two provisions narrowed those areas of governmental action, which could -previously in some cases without even meaningful argument -be found to fall outside the reach of judicial scrutiny. As Baroness Hale has recognised, following the implementation of the Human Rights Act, 'if a Convention right requires the court to examine and adjudicate upon matters which were previously regarded as non-justiciable, then adjudicate it must.' 15 The Human Rights Act therefore required that a higher standard of justification be applied before either legislative or executive interference with fundamental rights on national security grounds would be deemed to be necessary in a democratic society. National security might provide justification for interference with rights, but would no longer operate as an unquestionable trump.
But just as national security would no longer act to render judicial supervision meaningless, nor would the Human Rights Act subject all decisions taken in the name of the maintenance of security to judicial override. While judicial protection of ECHR rights is very clearly at the heart of the Human Rights Act scheme, the powers granted to courts do not permit the explicit invalidation of primary legislation and appreciate that infringements of qualified rights might be permissible -so long as proportionate -in pursuance of the protection of national security objectives. In parallel, the elected branches were also to shoulder partial responsibility for the realisation of the Human Rights Act project. Far then from simply amounting to an 'unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary' 16 the Human Rights Act sought to realign constitutional power in a more 4 sophisticated manner.
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Properly construed, the juridification prompted by the Human Rights Act should be seen as a complement, rather than a challenge, to democratic government. 18 Rather than to empower the judicial branch at the explicit expense of the political, the intent behind the Human Rights Act was to encourage protection of, and sensitivity to, rights through 'institutional balance, joint responsibility and deliberative dialogue.' 19 In a departure from the classic, constitutionalised and judicially-enforced bill of rights model, the Human Rights Act envisaged collaboration between the branches of government in which Parliament was intended to be as active a participant in protecting rights as the independent judiciary. 20 The Act therefore serves dual constitutional aims: first (and classically) to function as a judicially-imposed stop on rights-infringing policies and to permit the higher courts to highlight rights-based inadequacies in primary legislation; second to function as a catalyst for the development of rights-conscious policy and legislation.
In the national security arena, in which the effects of judicial supervision were historically as inconspicuous as they were ineffectual, 21 this rebalancing of constitutional supervisory powers might be seen as being unobjectionable, valuable, perhaps even to be celebrated. Given that national security decisions and policy were traditionally seen to be the sole preserve of the executive -'[t]he first duty of government is the defence of the realm' 22 -the Human Rights Act made the realisation of effective checks and balances a more tangible possibility. Yet the undoubted difficulty of the Human Rights Act was that it also brought with it the danger of breaking down the principled distinction between primary and secondary decision-maker that had traditionally supported judicial review of executive discretion. As a result, critics of juridification argued that within the enforcement of the Human Rights Act lay the potential to illegitimately stifle democratic governance through challenging the legal sovereignty of Parliament, 23 5 elected branches to 'capitulate' to the demands of adjudicative processes 24 and through prompting the development of only policy and legislation felt to be able to withstand judicial scrutiny. 25 Restraint of governmental power was, of course, a partial objective of the Human Rights Act, but the emergence of a so-called 'culture of compliance' under which the elected branches of government (in spite of the apparent institutional balance struck by the Human Rights Act) found themselves subjected -explicitly and implicitly -to judicial determinations of rights questions was also touted as a consequence of this rebalancing of constitutional power. 26 Though the likelihood of the (supposedly) sovereign UK Parliament suddenly reconceptualising itself as an 'adjunct of the courts' 27 in the aftermath of implementation of the Act seemed at best remote, this did not prevent advocates seeking to deny the ability of the courts to adjudicate over the compliance of decisions taken in the name of national security. As much is evident from the attempts of the Attorney General -in the seminal Belmarsh decision -to suggest that even in the light of the Human Rights Act "[i]t is for the Executive and Legislature, as a matter of political judgment, to decide what measures [are] necessary to protect public security". 28 In response to the Attorney General's attempt to oust the supervisory jurisdiction granted by the Human Rights Act, the then Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham, issued the following corrective
The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision making as in some way undemocratic. It is particularly inappropriate in a case such as the present in which Parliament has expressly legislated in section 6 of the 1998 Act to render unlawful any act of a public authority, including a court, incompatible with a Convention right, has required courts (in section 2) to take account of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, has (in section 3) required courts, so far as possible, to give effect to Convention rights and has conferred a right of appeal on derogation issues. The effect is not, of course, to override the sovereign legislative authority of the Queen in Parliament, since if primary legislation is declared to be incompatible the validity of the legislation is unaffected (section 4(6)) and the remedy lies with the appropriate minister (section 10), who is answerable to Parliament. The 1998 Act gives the courts a very specific, wholly democratic, mandate. 
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The sentiments behind Lord Bingham's admonishment of the Attorney General were echoed elsewhere in the House of Lords' decision.
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The consequence of the legislative direction provided by the Human Rights Act -as Lord Bingham noted in Belmarsh -was that judicial scrutiny of executive decisions and/or legislation taken in furtherance of national security objectives on the basis of the Convention rights enjoyed parliamentary (and therefore indirectly democratic) sanction. The fact that the Human Rights Act -a primary legislative instrument -required courts to exercise this counter-majoritarian function therefore provides a partial rejoinder to accounts of the judicialised constitution which emphasise the empire-building tendencies of the courts under which the judges themselves have lobbied for, and developed the common law in order to obtain, a greater constitutional role. 31 By contrast with the pre-Human Rights Act emergence of a nascent common law rights jurisprudence, 32 the courts' constitutional functions under the Act come with a legislative seal of approval.
The fact that the Human Rights Act was underpinned by a manifesto commitment made by the incoming 1997 Labour Administration, and subsequently enacted in primary legislation, cannot-however -fully address claims made by critics of the expanded reach of judicial power that the enforcement of standards against government "constrains the space for any future democratic decisions on that issue". 33 We can say that the juridification of questions of rights was a clear -albeit partialpolicy objective of the enactment and implementation of the Human Rights Act; but can also state that "political rights review" 34 is as integral to the design and operation of the Act as review undertaken by courts. Nor can the Human Rights Act's democratic heritage explain away the difficulties of its practical implementation, foras Mark Tushnet has observed 35 -the legislative mandate underpinning the courts' role in policing ECHR compliance at the national level disguises potential difficulties in its enforcement; judicial review under the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism 36 holds the potential to collapse into that which it seeks to eschewnamely, the polar opposites of strong form judicial review and the unchallengeable primacy of the political branches (as manifested in the formal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty).
The Continued Deification of National Security
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In spite of the legislative prompt provided by the Human Rights Act, obstacles to the justiciability of national security issues were, however, by no means immediately eradicated following the reception of ECHR rights into domestic law. The statutory juridification of rights issues in the national security arena was -initially at leastbeholden to the clear precedents regarding the perceived institutional incompetence of courts to question executive judgments taken in the interests of security.
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman -concerning the deportation of a Pakistani national on grounds of the potential threat to national security that he posed -the House of Lords unanimously deferred to the executive assessment of the risk presented. 37 As Lord Hoffmann noted
In matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy, which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons to whom the people have elected and whom they can remove. 38 Legitimacy in the field of national security decision making, Hoffmann contends, can only result from an electoral mandate. It follows that such decisions are -regardless of content or implications -due the respect of the judiciary.
Lord Hoffmann is not the only judge to perpetuate this rigid separation of function in the Human Rights Act era. Laws LJ too, in International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, spoke of the paradigmatic areas of executive responsibility (security being one) within which the courts cannot 'sensibly' scrutinise the merits of decisions taken. 39 Both approaches reflect a highly territorial approach to the separation of power under which certain governmental functions are held to be so umbilically linked to the role of a particular arm of government as to exclude any legitimate review or scrutiny undertaken by another branch. The resulting 'dilution' 40 of judicial scrutiny powers in relation to such functions holds the capacity to see judicial review rendered otiose on the basis of a perceived lack of legitimacy. 41 
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The continuance of this -to adopt Murray Hunt's terminology -spatial understanding of the interrelationship between the relevant powers of courts, executive and legislature in the national security arena is questionable. 42 First, it runs counter to the trend -begun in the mid-twentieth century -towards breaking down jurisdictional barriers to judicial review, 43 marking national security decisions out as being resistant to broader (judicially engineered) moves towards expanding the scope and rigour of judicial review. Second, through the denial of the relevance of the rights implications to the judicial assessment of the legality of national security decisions it frustrates the purpose of the Human Rights Act, namely to subject governmental decisions which impact on individual liberties to judicial scrutiny and supervision regardless of the area of policy in which the decision is taken.
The Necessary Superiority of the Political
Though the Human Rights Act sought to find a middle ground between the competing primacies of law and politics, the superior democratic claims of the political branches would not be easily displaced. As has already been alluded to, the continued influence of parliamentary sovereignty -and behind its façade the executive dominance of the legislature -perpetuates the sense that legislative decisions are (or should be) immune from challenge. While the standard common law decisions on the legal authority of Parliament -Ellen St Estates 44 and British Railways Board v. Pickin 45 among them -have lost some of their allure in the light of constitutional developments, 46 the sense among many that Parliament should remain necessarily supreme, and its decisions unquestionable in the courts, remains undiminished.
Michael Howard, then Leader of the Conservative Party, for instance responded to the Belmarsh decision in the following terms Parliament must be supreme. Aggressive judicial activism will not only undermine the public's confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, but it could also put our security at risk -and with it the freedoms the judges seek to defend. 47 9 Similar claims resonate beyond the national security arena, underpinning criticisms of perceived overreach by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 48 and of the excessive powers allocated to the courts under the Human Rights Act. Unease over this apparent new constitutional imbalance has prompted calls to reform or repeal the Human Rights Act in order to reassert the primacy of the elected branches: David Cameron -in taking the 2011 decision to convene a Commission to examine the case for the adoption of a British Bill of Rights -argued that "it is about time we ensured that [human rights] decisions are made in this Parliament rather than in the courts". 49 The picture painted is one of stark choices; between courts and Parliament, between legitimate or illegitimate decisions, between individual freedom and security. In the national security arena, this discourse is -as we have seen -underpinned by a weighty body of jurisprudence maintaining a division between questions of policy and law. At the level of constitutional principle this approach derives further support from the political constitution's ideological preference for elected officials over courts 50 and ultimately -of course -also appeals to the Diceyan subjection of courts to the will of Parliament. 51 This binary division of powers is -to a degree -reflected in the institutional design of the Human Rights Act; parliamentary sovereignty was clearly intended to be preserved in form. 52 But to deny the valid judicial input into questions engaging both rights and national security on that basis is to discount the rather more sophisticated separation of powers envisaged by the framers of the Act. 53 Responses of this sort to judicial decisions which are perceived to frustrate the objectives of democratically elected officials are, of course, by no means new. 54 But given the late-twentieth century rebalancing of constitutional power, culminating in the implementation of the Human Rights Act, such continued denials of judicial competence to examine legislative and executive decisions on rights grounds almost certainly tell us something about the failure of the Act to embed a culture of justification across constitutional processes and of the inability of dialogue theory to accurately capture the relative passion and dispassion of parliamentarians and judges. 55 The sense that Parliament be required to justify its enactments -that they be tested against (even self-imposed) standards of legality -therefore continues to sit uneasily with the constitution's traditional reverence for statutory language and the unquestionable legal authority of the legislature. 56 In the face of this tension, claims regarding the solidity of the Human Rights Act's position within the United Kingdom's new constitutional settlement should be treated with a degree of caution, but so too do those arguments which would position the elected branches as now finding themselves at the mercy of the judges.
While it has long been acknowledged that courts play a political role -"[t]o require a supreme court to make certain kinds of political decisions does not make those decisions any less political" 57 -the extent to which judicial intervention is permitted, and the consequences of intervention for the decision under scrutiny, remain issues of intense controversy. But accurate assessment of these issues is, it is argued, hampered by base-level denials of the role to be played by courts in the assessment of certain areas claimed to be within the exclusive competence of the executive or legislature. To defend an activity as being based on a "pre-eminently political judgment" 58 should not insulate that activity from questioning scrutiny (within Parliament or the courts) any more that it should automate compliance with law.
Deference and Relative Institutional Competence
Deference has in many respects become the "the classic separation of powers device articulated in the post-Human Rights Act era". 59 It is the method by which the potential for Human Rights Act review to morph into something altogether more potent, more capable (perhaps) of truly stifling democratic government, has been -for the most part -avoided. 60 That perceived institutional superiority should impact on judicial responses to legislative initiatives argued to infringe rights should -in a system shaped by parliamentary sovereignty -come as no great surprise. Deference 'as submission' -that is, the self-denial of the competence to scrutinise decisions in specific areas of policy -is however incompatible with the new constitutional equilibrium which the Human Rights Act sought to cement. 61 To this extent, Lord Hoffmann -in the ProLife Alliance decision -was correct to highlight the inaccuracy of the apparent subjection of courts to the elected branches perpetuated by the language of deference. 62 While a degree of deference is -as Lord Bingham has recognised 63 -a natural response to the uncertain territory the judges are confronted with in assessing the ECHR implications of national security decisions, this has not (indeed should not) come at the expense of meaningful scrutiny of the rights issues raised. In Belmarsh, as much was recognised by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry who noted that "[d]eference does not mean abasement … even in matters of national security". 64 Nor -despite the "great weight" 65 which continues to attach to primary legislation -is deference the automated judicial response to legislative action; as Lord Bingham noted in Lichniak, "[t]he fact that a statute represents the settled will of the democratic assembly is not a conclusive reason for upholding it". 66 What deference does permit, however, is the preservation of the sense that certain decisions are more appropriately determined by (elected) political actors
The more purely political … a question is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will be the potential role of the court. It is the function of political and not judicial bodies to resolve political questions. 67 This concession -while perhaps a truism -importantly does not exclude the possibility, or legitimacy, of judicial review. 68 However, while the abandonment of submissive deference marked by Belmarsh stands as a clear step towards closing the accountability loop in national security decisions this is not to suggest that the deployment of ECHR based review has been without controversy. Deference might serve to preserve respect for the policy choices of the primary decision-maker, but the balance of power apparent on the face of the Act may nonetheless present difficulties once deployed in practice.
First, the readiness of courts to 'read in' implied conditions and terms into ostensibly clear legislative provisions has, in particular, drawn criticism from the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). In its 2008 report into Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights, the Joint Committee noted with some surprise the willingness of the Law Lords to read words into statutory provisions in order to render them compatible with the ECHR rights. 69 Specifically, the JCHR considered that the use of section 3(1) in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB was Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the Law Lords felt compelled to apply the Strasbourg ruling. Second then, the nature of the appropriate response of national courts in human rights litigation may well be conditioned by factors external to the Human Rights Act itself, and to the courts' perceptions of their own institutional competence vis-à-vis the elected branches of government. Even though the Law Lords were conscious that the consequence of their decision might be abandonment of the control order regime, the outcome was felt to be unavoidable in the light of the state's obligations under the ECHR: "[e]ven though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum -Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed".
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Engagement, Refinement, Dialogue?
It is of course correct to say that Parliament, the executive and courts undertake different constitutional functions, 81 and that primary responsibility for certain of those functions might rest with one branch of government. But to then say that -as a result -those functions should continue to be immune to scrutiny by one or more of the other branches is to suggest something quite different. The Human Rights Act has gone some way to establishing a new constitutional equilibrium. 82 Human Rights Act review does not subject the elected branches of government to the rule of the courts, but cultivates a tension between the two that is abundantly clear in the realm of state security
The first responsibility of government in a democratic society is owed to the public. It is to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens. It is the duty of the court to do all that it can to respect and uphold that principle. But the court has another duty too. It is to protect and safeguard the rights of the individual.
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Even in the light of the developments prompted by the Human Rights Act, the role of the courts remains constitutionally secondary in at least one crucial respect; as Laws LJ has written
The judges are constrained … rightly, by the fact that their role is reactive; they cannot initiate; all they can do is apply principle to what is brought before them by others. Nothing could be more distinct from the duty of political creativity owed to us by Members of Parliament. 84 To suggest that the Human Rights Act therefore "welcomes the courts into the policymaking process" 85 is to mislead as to the necessarily responsive role played by the domestic judiciary when asked to examine ECHR compliance of a particular policy or legislative initiative.
